Eliminativism about consciousness
(with Liz Irvine)
Final version due to appear in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness (edited by U. Kriegel), Oxford University Press: Oxford
Last updated 10 August 2018 (Draft only – Do not quote without permission)
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Eliminativism
- 3 Consciousness
- 4 Entity eliminativism about consciousness
- 5 Discourse eliminativism about consciousness
- 6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine a radical philosophical position about consciousness: eliminativism. Eliminativists claim that consciousness does not exist and/or that talk of consciousness should be eliminated from science. These are strong positions to take, and require serious defence. To evaluate these positions, the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the difference between entity eliminativism and discourse eliminativism and outline the typical strategies used to support each. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the kinds of consciousness we refer to throughout the chapter. Section 4 focuses on entity eliminativist arguments about consciousness: Dennett’s classic eliminativist argument (4.1); a rebooted version of Dennett’s argument (4.2); and recent arguments for ‘illusionism’ (4.3). In Section 5, we examine discourse eliminativist arguments about consciousness: methodological arguments from scientific behaviourism (5.1); arguments based on the empirical accessibility of phenomenal consciousness (5.2); and a stronger version of discourse eliminativism aimed at both phenomenal and access consciousness (5.3). In Section 6, we offer a brief conclusion.
If you meet an eliminativist, the first question to ask is, ‘What do you want to eliminate: entities or talk about entities?’ For any given \(X\), an eliminativist might say either or both of:
- \(X\)s do not exist
- We should stop engaging in \(X\)-talk, using \(X\)-concepts, or other practices ostensibly associated with \(X\) in science
We will call (1) entity eliminativism and (2) discourse eliminativism. Entity eliminativists claim that we should expel a specific entity from the catalogue of entities assumed to exist. This may be a matter of removing a particular individual from our ontology (e.g. Zeus), but it could also involve removing a property (e.g. being phlogisticated), an event (e.g. spontaneous generation), a kind (e.g. ghosts), or a process (e.g. extrasensory perception). In contrast, a discourse eliminativist seeks to rid science of certain ways of talking, thinking, and acting (e.g. talk about, and practices that attempt to investigate, gods, being phlogisticated, spontaneous generation, ghosts, or extrasensory perception).1
Entity and discourse eliminativism are distinct but obviously not unrelated positions. What we think regarding an entity’s existence does not, and should not, float free from what we say, think, and do in science. However, the relationship between the two is not so tight that one form of eliminativism can be inferred from the other as a matter of course.2 Someone might endorse one form of eliminativism but not the other. An entity eliminativist might do away with some entity (e.g. atoms) but to preserve talk, thought, and practices associated with that entity in science. For example, Mach claimed that atoms do not exist but he argued that physicists should continue to engage in atomic talk, thought, and action for their predictive and heuristic benefits: the atom ‘exists only in our understanding, and has for us only the value of a memoria technica or formula’ (Mach 1911 p. 49). Conversely, a discourse eliminativist might root out ways of talking, thinking, and acting from science but say that the entity underlying this rejected discourse nonetheless exists. In Section 5, we will see an example of this position with regard to scientific behaviourism’s treatment of conscious experience.
Let us examine entity eliminativism and discourse eliminativism more closely.
Entity eliminativism is defined by its divergence from realism and agnosticism. A realist says, ‘\(X\)s exist’, an agnostic says, ‘We are not in a position to know whether \(X\)s exist or not’, and an eliminativist says, ‘\(X\)s do not exist’. In order for an entity eliminativist to have a genuine claim, she needs to have a genuine, not merely a verbal, disagreement with the realist and agnostic. To this end, the eliminativist needs to make assumptions about what \(X\)s are and those need to be shared with the realist and the agnostic. The realist, agnostic, and eliminativist should agree on what \(X\)s would be like if they were to exist. What they disagree about is whether \(X\)s do exist. Consequently, an argument for entity eliminativism generally involves two ingredients. The first is some way to identify the subject matter under dispute that is acceptable to all sides (realist, agnostic, and eliminativist). This is often done by providing a description of the essential properties of the entity, but, as we will see in Section 4.2, this is not the only way to do it. The second ingredient is an argument to show that no such entity exists. If the entity is identified by description, the second step may try to show that no entity satisfies the description. Mallon et al. (2009) describe how this style of argument has been used to defend eliminativism about beliefs (and other propositional attitudes): first, claim that in order for something to be a belief, it must satisfy a certain description D (given in this case by folk psychology); second, argue that nothing satisfies description D (because folk psychology is false); third, since nothing satisfies D, conclude that beliefs do not exist.
In contrast to entity eliminativism, discourse eliminativism targets talk, thought, and behaviour in science. Let us say that the concept ‘ding dong’ refers to nanoscale, spherical, tentacled lifeforms. A discourse eliminativist about ding dongs says that scientists should stop talking, thinking, and pursuing research programmes about ding dongs. One motivation for this may be the conviction that there are no ding dongs (i.e. one is an entity eliminativist about them). But being an entity eliminativist about them is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a discourse eliminativist. One might think that ding dongs exist (or be an agnostic) but argue that scientists should avoid ‘ding dong’ talk and thought because it is unproductive, misleading, or otherwise unhelpful. Conversely, one might think that ding dongs do not exist but argue that ‘ding dong’ talk, thought, and practice is useful to science and should be preserved: perhaps the ding dong concept is a useful way to group lifeforms or encourages useful practices (looking for entities at certain spatial scales).
Arguments for discourse eliminativism typically consist of a negative part and a positive part. The negative part aims to establish that the talk, concepts, and practices targeted for elimination are somehow unhelpful, damaging, misleading, or otherwise problematic. In the case of conscious experience, a discourse eliminativist might argue that the relevant discourse is too subjective, hard to verify, does not generalise well, does not pick out a natural kind, produces intractable disagreements, does not cohere with other scientific talk, or otherwise leads to a degenerative scientific research programme. However, even if the discourse eliminativist’s negative points land, they rarely suffice to motivate scientific change. Science seldom switches course unless a better alternative is available. The positive part of a discourse eliminativist’s argument aims to show that an alternative way of talking, thinking, and acting is available to science. The discourse eliminativist argues that this proposed alternative discourse is, on balance, better for achieving our scientific goals than that targeted for elimination. Diverse virtues may weigh in this decision, including purely epistemic virtues (e.g. telling the truth, not positing things that do not exist) but also predictive, pragmatic, theoretical, and cognitive virtues.
In this chapter, we make use of Block’s distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness (Block 1990, 2007). ‘Access consciousness’ refers to the aspects of consciousness associated with information processing: storage of information in working memory, planning, reporting, control of action, decision making, and so on. ‘Phenomenal consciousness’ refers to the subjective feelings and experiences that conscious agents enjoy: the feel of silk, the taste of raspberries, the sounds of birds singing, and so on. The latter is the ‘feel-y’, subjective, qualitative, what-it-is-like-ness, ‘from the inside’ aspect of consciousness. We use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to this subjective feeling.3 Following Frankish (2016a), we define ‘experience’ in a purely functional way: mental states that are the direct output of the sensory system. This means that we do not assume that experience necessarily involves phenomenal consciousness.4
This chapter focuses on eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. Access consciousness will make an appearance in the final section (5.3). For the purposes of this chapter, we do not presuppose anything about the relationship between access and phenomenal consciousness, though some of the eliminativist arguments discussed below do take a stand on this.
One of the striking features of entity eliminativism about consciousness is that it is perceived as a philosophical position that is self-evidently wrong. Critics say that questioning the existence of phenomenal consciousness is impossible. Each of us knows, by introspection on our own case, that we have phenomenal consciousness – what is more, we know this in a way that is not open to rational doubt. Not even Descartes doubted the existence of his subjective experience. Yet the eliminativist does this. Assessments of eliminativist claims have been correspondingly harsh. Frances writes, ‘I assume that eliminativism about feelings really is crazy’ (Frances 2008 p. 241). Searle, ‘Surely no sane person could deny the existence of feelings’ (Searle 1997). Strawson says that eliminativists ‘seem to be out of their minds’, their position is ‘crazy, in a distinctively philosophical way’ (Strawson 1994 p. 101). Chalmers, ‘This is the sort of thing that can only be done by a philosopher, or by someone else tying themselves in intellectual knots!’ (Chalmers 1996 p. 188). How can anyone deny such a self-evident and foundational truth about our mental life? (As we will see in Section 4, entity eliminativism is typically combined with an attack against the reliability of our introspective access to phenomenal consciousness.)
The discourse eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness faces a similar, though perhaps not quite so daunting, challenge. Discourse eliminativists identify problems with a scientific discourse and seek to offer a better alternative. The challenge faced by a discourse eliminativist about phenomenal consciousness is that phenomenal consciousness appears to be an incredibly important part of human mental life. Humans care about their phenomenal feelings: about the feelings that accompany eating their favourite dish, scoring a winning goal, being punched in the kidneys, or having their toes tickled. These feelings play a valuable, although hard to specify, role in our cognitive economy. For this reason, it seems that some reference to phenomenal consciousness should be made by a scientific psychology. A science that never talked about phenomenal consciousness would be incomplete in some way. Even if phenomenal feelings do not exist (as an entity eliminativist says), science should still talk about phenomenal consciousness in order to explain why we (falsely, according to the entity eliminativist) take ourselves to be motivated by such feelings. Eliminating talk of phenomenal consciousness appears to ignore a significant aspect of human mental life and would constitute a failure of ambition for scientific psychology.
4 Entity eliminativism about consciousness
In this section, we examine three entity eliminativist arguments about phenomenal consciousness. The first is Dennett’s ‘Quining qualia’ argument (1988). The second is a rebooted version of Dennett’s argument that aims to avoid the standard objection to that argument (namely, that Dennett mis-characterises phenomenal consciousness). The third is the recent research project of ‘illusionism’, which is related to Dennett’s ‘Quining qualia’ argument but motivated on somewhat different grounds.
4.1 Dennett’s eliminativism about qualia
Dennett’s ‘Quining qualia’ paper appears to be a classic entity eliminativist argument: describe the essential properties of the alleged entity; show that nothing satisfies this description; conclude on this basis that no such entity exists. The description that Dennett gives of phenomenal consciousness (’qualia’) is that it is ineffable (not describable in words), intrinsic (non-relational), private (no inter-personal comparisons are possible), and directly accessible (via direct acquaintance). The final property is related to the idea that we have privileged, incorrigible, or infallible access to qualia. Dennett argues that no entity satisfies this description. As a result, ‘Far better, tactically, to declare that there simply are no qualia at all’ (Dennett 1988 p. 44).
Dennett uses a number of ‘intuition pumps’ to get to this conclusion, which we summarise here.
First, it is plausible that how things subjectively feel is bound up with how you evaluate, or are able to categorise or discriminate between, your experiences. Someone’s first taste of a particular wine may be different to how it tastes to them after having become a wine aficionado. At first, my taste of the wine was bound up with judgements of yukkiness and an inability to easily tell one wine from another. My current taste of the wine is bound up with gustatory enjoyment and an ability to finely discriminate between different wines. This suggests that qualia are not intrinsic properties of experience: that the taste of this specific wine does not have a particular qualitative feeling (quale) for me independently of how I evaluate or categorise it. Instead, the way that wine (and other things) consciously tastes to me is at least partly determined by relational properties, such as whether I like it, and whether I can tell a Pinot Grigio from a Chardonnay.
This also puts pressure on qualia being directly accessible: it looks like I can’t tell very much about my qualia from introspection. Say that as you get older, you start liking strong red wine more. One possibility is that your sensory organs have changed, making strong reds taste different and more pleasurable compared to how they used to. On this scenario, you now have different qualitative feelings (more pleasant ones) on tasting strong reds than you had before. Another possibility is that your sensory organs have stayed the same but your likings for specific experiences have changed. You have roughly the same conscious feelings but now you like those feelings more. On the first scenario, your qualia change; on the second scenario, your qualia stay the same. Dennett puts it to us that we would not be able to tell, merely from introspection, which scenario we are in. Yet this should be easy to do if we really had direct (or infallible or incorrigible) access to our qualia.
With respect to the putative ineffability and privacy of qualia, Dennett refers to Wittgensteinian arguments that render entirely private and incommunicable states senseless. Dennett goes on to argue that there is a way in which experiences are practically ineffable and private, just not in the ‘special’ way intended by qualiaphiles. Imagine two AI systems that learn about their environment in a fairly unsupervised manner and so go on to develop different internal systems of categorising colour (adapted from Sloman & Chrisley 2003). These two systems will end up with some states that are (at least to some degree) private and ineffable. One system’s ‘blue’ states will be somewhat different to the other system’s ‘blue’ states just in virtue of the internal differences in the systems (e.g. the ‘blue’ states of each system will be triggered by a slightly different range of hues). In the same way, humans can be in distinct (practically) ineffable and private states because of idiosyncrasies in their perceptual and cognitive processing. Some of these differences one may discover empirically (e.g. that you and I disagree about whether a particular paint chip is blue), and so we can make our experience more ‘effable’, and less private. Dennett’s point is that ineffability and privacy of experience only amounts to this: practical and graded difficulties in assessing which internal state we are in, not essential properties of our experience.
In light of Dennett’s considerations, it looks like our supposedly phenomenal experiences do not satisfy the description associated with qualia: there is nothing ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly accessible to an experiencer that determines the way that things (phenomenally) seem to them. Whatever produces our judgements and reports about phenomenal experience, it is not an entity of the hypothesised kind. Qualia, as characterised by Dennett’s description, do not exist.
A popular response to Dennett is to say that qualia are not accurately characterised by his description. This would effectively undermine his argument at the first step. Perhaps partly for this reason, qualia realists nowadays tend to favour a more minimalistic characterisation of qualia. Qualia need only have a phenomenal character (a ‘what-is-it-like-ness’ or subjective feel) (Carruthers 2000; Kind 2001; Levine 2001; Tye 2002). They need not be intrinsic, private, ineffable, or directly accessible properties of experience. Frankish (2012) describes this as the move from ‘classic qualia’ to ‘diet qualia’.5 Classic qualia are controversial entities; diet qualia are not:
Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is very difficult to deny that there are qualia. There is another, more restricted use of the term ‘qualia’, under which qualia are intrinsic, introspectively accessible, nonrepresentational qualities of experiences. In my view, there are no qualia, conceived of in this way. They are a philosophical myth. (Tye 2002 p. 447)
Dennett wants to eliminate both classic qualia and diet qualia.6 We have seen that his argument does not work against diet qualia: his description fails to pick out what qualiaphiles have in mind.7 In the next section, we rework Dennett’s eliminativist argument to be effective against diet qualia.
4.2 ‘Quining qualia’ rebooted
Dennett’s ‘Quining qualia’ argument identified qualia by description. This does not work for diet qualia as there is no description that can identify them apart from their (contested) phenomenal feel. An alternative to identification by description is to identify qualia by a kind of ostension. The idea is to ‘point’ to alleged examples of qualia and then generalise to the kind they have in common.8 One asks one’s interlocutor to consider those of her experiences that allegedly have qualia (consider the feel of silk, …), draw attention to the supposedly felt aspects of these experiences, and suggest we discuss aspects of mental life of this kind. A set of examples, and how they appear relevantly similar to us, are thus intended to fix the meaning of ‘qualia’. The realist and eliminativist may agree on this identification strategy: they may agree on the set of examples and how we should take them to be similar. They may, for instance, have no difficulty generalising from the examples to new cases. What the realist and eliminativist disagree about is whether the phenomenal feelings that appear to be present in these cases really are present. The realist claims that the experiences have, or instantiate, a property, ‘what-it-is-like-ness’, which should be added to our ontology. The ‘what-it-is-like-ness’ or phenomenal character is a real property of experience – as real as anything else. The realist says that explaining what this phenomenal property is, how it comes about, and how it relates to physical properties is the job of a theory of consciousness. In contrast, the entity eliminativist says that no such property exists (or is instantiated in the relevant cases). According to her, the examples are, in a sense, deceptive: they appear to show instantiation of a property, but that appearance is wrong. There is no such property of experience.
An entity eliminativist denies the existence of qualia, but she does not deny the existence of many of our judgements, beliefs, and desires about qualia. This allows her to agree with a lot of what a realist says about experience. She can agree that we believe that our experience has qualia, that it is hard for us to doubt that our experience has qualia, and that our beliefs and judgements motivate us to act in appropriate ways. Nevertheless, the eliminativist says, these beliefs and judgements are false. They are comparable to the beliefs and judgements of the ancient Greeks about Zeus: deeply held and capable of motivating action, but fundamentally mistaken. We should no more take on the project of explaining what qualia are, how they arise, and how they relate to physical properties than we should for Zeus.
We divide the rebooted version of Dennett’s argument into two steps. The first step aims to establish a sceptical claim: we do not know which (diet) quale our current experience instantiates. The claim is we lack any knowledge at all, even in principle, of which quale our experience instantiates; this goes beyond a mere failure of infallibility or incorrigiblity. The second step leverages this qualia scepticism to argue for qualia eliminativism. If the instantiation of one quale rather than another is in principle unknowable, then instantiation of a quale is a difference that makes no difference to the world; on that basis, qualia should be eliminated.
As a starting point, notice that it is sometimes hard to tell which quale your experience instantiates. Slow, subtle shifts in experience may leave one uncertain about which subjective feeling you have – is the quale you have now on looking at an Yves Klein blue painting the same as you had a minute ago? Examples like this may present us with epistemically ‘bad’ cases of qualia knowledge: situations where for some reason we are unsure about which quale we have. Showing that there are some ‘bad’ cases, however, does not show that we can never know which quale we have.9
Focus instead on apparently ‘good’ cases of qualia knowledge: cases where we appear to know (for certain) whether our qualia have changed or are the same. These generally involve sudden or dramatic changes in one’s experience. If the blue Yves Klein painting in front of you were suddenly exchanged for a bright yellow painting, you would know, not only that the painting had changed, but also that your phenomenal experience had changed (perhaps you would regard knowledge of the latter as part of your evidence base for the former). Dramatic changes in experience seem to provide good cases of qualia knowledge. However, even in those ‘good’ cases, there are reasons to think that one lacks knowledge about which quale one has.
Suppose that while Lara is asleep a neurosurgeon operates on her brain. On waking, she finds that the world ‘looks different’ to her: objects that before looked blue now look yellow. No one else notices the change, so Lara reasons that something must have happened to her brain. Prima facie, Lara appears to have justification to think that her qualia have changed. After all, things ‘look different’ now. However, what she notices is compatible with two hypotheses:
- Lara’s qualia have changed from those she had yesterday
- Lara’s qualia remain the same but her memories of her past experiences have changed
Lara’s post-surgery experiences would be introspectively indistinguishable under either Q or R. On the basis of introspection, Lara knows that things ‘look different’, but she cannot tell what is the cause of this: a change in her memory, a change in her qualia, or some combination of both. The problem is more serious than a lack of certainty or failure of infallibility. Q and R are equally supported by Lara’s introspective evidence. Introspection thus gives her no knowledge at all about whether her qualia have changed. As far as introspection goes, she has no reason to favour one hypothesis over the other.
Lara, however, has access to other sources of knowledge than introspection. What if she were to look at changes in her brain? For the sake of argument, put Lara into the strongest possible epistemic position with regard to the physical state of her brain. She has perfect neuroscientific knowledge and full scans of her brain before and after surgery. Furthermore, suppose (unrealistically, but helpfully for Lara) that there is a clear separation in the neural basis of Lara’s sensory systems and the neural basis of her memory systems which is known to her. She can then reason as follows:
If the brain scans reveal that the neural change affected only my sensory systems and left my memory systems intact, I have reason to favour Q over R because only the systems that support my current experience, and not those that support my memories of past experiences, have been affected. Conversely, if the scans reveal that the neural change affected only my memory systems and left my sensory systems intact, then I have reason to favour R over Q because only the systems that support my memories, and not those that support my current experience, have been affected.
Thus it seems that empirical evidence can do for Lara what introspection alone cannot: it can give her reason to favour Q over R. (Of course, it is possible that both Lara’s sensory and memory systems are affected by the surgery, but we will ignore this possibility as it does not help her.)
The problem is this reasoning depends on a highly questionable assumption. Brain scans provide Lara with information about changes to her neural events but that only helps her with Q and R if she knows where in the causal order of those neural events her qualia experience occurs. Lara, however, does not know this, and by hypothesis it is not part of the concept of diet qualia. Consider two competing hypotheses about where her qualia experience might occur in the causal order of neural events:
- Sensation \(\rightarrow\) qualia experience \(\rightarrow\) memory access
- Sensation \(\rightarrow\) memory access \(\rightarrow\) qualia experience
Lara’s reasoning assumed something like (1): her qualia experience occurs after her current sensation and before memory access. Memory access is causally downstream from her qualia experience; her qualia experience ‘screens off’ her sensation from her memory. This suggests that any surgery-induced change to the neural basis of her memory system should have a differential effect on her qualia experience to any surgery-induced change to the neural basis of her sensory system: one affects something after her qualia experience, the other affects something before. If Lara discovers a neural change exclusively to her memory system, that suggests her current qualia experience has been unaffected, because the causal antecedents of that experience remain the same as they were yesterday. However, if she discovers a neural change to her sensory system (e.g. her sensory channels are swapped), and no change to the neural basis of her memory system, that suggests that a change to her current sensation and hence current qualia experience is responsible for the change she notices. We are in the realm of causal inference here, which falls short of providing deductive certainty (a cause could conceivably produce any effect). But at least Lara has some reason to prefer Q to R.
Unfortunately, this justification vanishes if (2) is true. On (2), Lara’s qualia experience is causally downstream from both her sensation and memory access. A surgery-induced change to the neural basis of either system could potentially affect her current qualia experience. A change to the neural basis of her memory could produce a change in her current qualia or a change in her memory of past experiences, or both. A change to the neural basis of her sensory system could produce a change in her current qualia or a change in the outputs of her memory systems, or both. The observable factors for which Lara can detect change (the neural bases of her memory and sensation) both lie causally upstream from her qualia experience, and so are confounded in causal inference about that experience.
No one knows whether (1), (2), or any number of other proposals about the order of qualia experience in neural events is correct. This is not a limit of technology – a better scanner or more neuroscientific data would not help. Nor is it something with which the concept of diet qualia can help: that concept is silent about the causal location of qualia in neural events. One might attempt to correlate Lara’s introspective reports of qualia with her neural events to find out where among those events her qualia experience falls. However, we have already seen that there is no reason to trust Lara’s introspective reports about occurrence of, or changes in, her qualia in this context.10 Neither introspection, nor empirical knowledge, nor some combination of the two tells Lara which quale she has. Even in an apparently ‘good’ case, there is no reason to favour Q or R. Given that our own epistemic position is more precarious than that of Lara (we lack complete physical knowledge of our brains), our own qualia may, for all we know, be changing without us noticing.11
This accounts for Step 1 of the argument. Step 2 says that if changes in one’s current qualia are in principle unknowable (either by introspection or by methods available to empirical science), then we should eliminate qualia from our ontology. The thought underlying Step 2 is that qualia are an extra ‘wheel’ that do not turn anything in our ontology. Qualia have no discernible characteristic effect – for if they did, Lara could use that to detect them. A quale’s effect on us is always confounded with that of other factors (such as memory). Therefore, affirming the existence of qualia as independent, free standing entities in our ontology seems unmotivated. Like Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle’,
[This] thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even be empty – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. (Wittgenstein 1958 sec. 293)
It is open to a realist to insist that qualia should be included in our ontology irrespective of our inability to detect them (similarly, a beetle realist could insist that there really is a beetle in the box). But this seems at best unmotivated and at worse an expression of a dogmatic commitment to qualia realism no matter what. In light of the problems above, qualia do not appear to earn their ontological keep. Better to say that as inessential cruft, they should be eliminated.
Unlike Dennett’s original argument, the rebooted argument does not rely on the assumption that qualia are intrinsic, private, ineffable, or directly accessible. Before closing, we wish to flag two problems with the argument.
First, one might wonder, even if the argument is correct, why it nevertheless seems to us that qualia exist. This ‘seeming’ does not go away even if one embraces the eliminativist’s conclusion. On this basis, one might press for a residual role for qualia that provides more than an eliminativist would allow: more than merely being associated with a set of dispositions to make judgements, or with having a set of beliefs about qualia (both compatible with those judgements and beliefs being false). Our relationship to qualia appears to be more primitive than this. It seems to us that our experiences have qualia and this ‘seeming’ is the evidence for our beliefs about qualia. How can this impression, this pre-doxastic ‘seeming’, be produced? One might tell a mechanistic and adaptationist story about how humans arrive at false beliefs about qualia (Dennett 1991; Humphrey 1992). But what mechanistic story can be told that explains the production of seemings that generate and appear to confirm these beliefs? This is the ‘illusion problem’, discussed in the next section, and it remains an unsolved challenge for qualia eliminativists.
Second, one might object to the qualia scepticism of Step 1. Step 1 relies on questioning the reliability of memory-based comparisons: Does Lara know whether a quale she has today is the same as one she had yesterday? A realist might concede that she does not know this (perhaps because of confounds with memory), but deny that Lara lacks any knowledge at all of which quale she has. Imagine looking out on a mountain scene with green grass, grey rock, and blue sky. Multiple qualia are instantiated simultaneously in your experience: what-it-is-like to see green, what-it-is-like to see grey, what-it-is-like to see blue, and so on. You can tell the difference between these qualia (you can make similarity judgements, detect that there are many qualia versus a few, distinguish between your visual, auditory, and proprioceptive qualia, and so on). None of these judgements appear to rely on memory. Within the domain of current experience, therefore, you appear to have some knowledge about which qualia your experience instantiates. But then, why think that qualia are a wheel that turns nothing or are always unknowable and confounded with memory in their effect on you?
4.3 The illusionist movement
Recently, interest in eliminativist approaches to phenomenal aspects of consciousness has been rekindled by Frankish, in particular in a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Frankish outlines ‘illusionism’ as the view that experiences have no phenomenal properties and that our phenomenal feelings are ‘illusory’. We think we have experiences with phenomenal properties, but in fact we do not. Illusionism is a form of entity eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness even if the label ‘eliminativism’ is avoided for rhetorical reasons. It is motivated somewhat differently to Dennett’s entity eliminativism, and has a slightly different focus, so is worth discussion in its own right.12
First, illusionism is partly motivated by taking seriously the idea that phenomenal properties, and phenomenal consciousness, cannot be accounted for scientifically. Illusionism is seen as a way out of this problem. Second (and relatedly), the reasons for favouring illusionism are mainly rather general, theoretical reasons. The theoretical virtue of simplicity, or conservativism, suggests that the fewer entities/properties the better. Since illusionism gets rid of the metaphysically and epistemically problematic phenomenal properties, illusionism is better than alternative realist positions. Third, illusionism is often argued to be a research programme rather than a set of worked-out claims, and this research programme is worth pursuing more than its alternatives. As we will see, illusionism comes with a range of difficult open questions.
Illusionism follows a slightly different tack to the typical argument for entity eliminativism described in Section 2. The first step is supposed to be identifying the contested entity/property in a way that can be generally accepted. This is not straightforward for phenomenal properties (see discussion both above and below). Second, the arguments motivating illusionism are not direct arguments to the effect that phenomenal properties, as described, do not exist; the position is largely motivated on other grounds (e.g. theoretical simplicity). The third step of the classic argument is to conclude that phenomenal properties do not exist. This is also concluded by some proponents of illusionism, but one could arguably also treat illusionism as a promising research programme without in advance committing to this conclusion.
Challenges to illusionism come in roughly three forms (the first two roughly track two of the steps above).
First, one might argue that it is neither obvious nor universally accepted what phenomenal consciousness is, or what phenomenal properties are, such that a proposal to eliminate them is comprehensible. Mandik (2016) states that ‘phenomenal’ is a technical (not folk) term, but one that is not clearly defined. As such, both eliminativist and realist talk about ‘phenomenality’ is unwarranted; in neither case is there a clear target to be eliminativist or realist about. Schwitzgebel (2016) tries to provide a minimal ‘definition by example’ that is not committed to any particular (troublesome) metaphysical or epistemic commitments, but as Frankish (2016b) points out, this is not substantive enough to sway the debate one way or the other.
Second, one might reject some of the main theoretical motivations for thinking illusionism is the best or most reasonable philosophical position available. For example, Balog (2016) defends the phenomenal concept strategy, which preserves realism about phenomenal properties but concedes the existence of an explanatory gap. Prinz (2016) also defends a realist account of phenomenal properties, but one that tries to close the explanatory gap by providing neuroscientific explanation of at least some aspects of phenomenal consciousness. More generally, unless one is convinced that the theoretical virtues of illusionism (ontological parsimony, fit with existing non-phenomenal science, avoidance of the hard problem of consciousness) are superior to rival positions on consciousness, one is unlikely to persuaded of illusionism.
Third, a cluster of worries arise around the ‘illusion problem’. This concerns how to account for the alleged illusion of phenomenality. How can one have experiences that appear to have phenomenal properties without any phenomenal properties existing? Frankish (2016a) labels those physical properties (perhaps highly disjunctive and gerrymandered) that typically cause us to misrepresent ourselves as having phenomenal qualities, ‘quasi-phenomenal properties’. Quasi-phenomenal redness is, for example, the physical property that typically causes (false) representations of phenomenal redness in introspection. According to Frankish, it is the tokening of these false introspective representations that is responsible for the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. He likens their effect on us to that of other resilient, mistaken perceptual representations such as those of impossible figures like the Penrose triangle (Humphrey 2011) or of colours as ‘out there’ in the world (Pereboom 2011).
The worry is how exactly this is supposed to work. It is not clear how a false representation caused by non-phenomenal properties could produce an appearance or ‘seeming’ of phenomenality. And as Prinz puts it, ‘… what is it about beliefs in experience that causes an illusion of experience?’ (2016 p. 194). How is it that these representations cause illusions of subjective experience when other sorts of false representations do not? Related to this is a worry about how such false introspective representations get their content (Balog 2016). Representations of phenomenal feelings are not like other empty or non-referring representations (’unicorn’, ‘the largest prime’). Those get their content by being semantic constructs from representations that do refer (’horse’, ‘horned’, ‘largest’, ‘prime’). Representations of phenomenal experience do not seem to be like this; they do not seem to be composites of representations of non-phenomenal properties.
Illusionism promises to get us away from the hard problem. It effectively eliminates the ‘data’ the hard problem asks us to explain – phenomenal feelings. Prinz (2016) argues that the illusion problem and the hard problem in fact face similar difficulties. In both cases, we need to identify what phenomenal properties are. In the hard problem, we need to explain how phenomenal properties come out of ‘mere matter’: how feelings arise in an apparently non-phenomenal system. In the illusion problem, we need to explain how (vivid!) illusions of phenomenality come about in entirely non-phenomenal systems. The challenge is to explain how an illusion of phenomenality (worthy of that name) arises in a non-phenomenal system. In both cases, then, one needs to explain how something suitably like phenomenality arises from ‘mere matter’. By the time one has done this, it might be just as easy to be a realist as an illusionist.
Frankish (2016a) briefly discusses the relationship between illusionism and discourse eliminativism: ‘Do illusionists then recommend eliminating talk of phenomenal properties and phenomenal consciousness? Not necessarily’ (p. 21). We agree. However, Frankish goes on to suggest that a commitment to discourse eliminativism can only be avoided by an illusionist if the phenomenal terms in science are redefined to refer to quasi-phenomenal properties – the physical properties that typically cause the relevant false introspective representations. This seems to us neither necessary nor likely.
First, as Frankish says, it would depart from what these terms mean in other contexts, and so it would invite confusion. Second, although we agree with Frankish that an illusionist scientific psychology would need to talk about quasi-phenomenal properties, this would most naturally be done with a response-dependent characterisation of those properties: refer to the physical properties that typically give rise to specific (false) phenomenal representations. Keeping track of quasi-phenomenal properties does not require redefining the language of phenomenal terms in science. Third, as Frankish (2016b) says, it is no part of illusionism to say that the illusion of conscious experience is not important or useful to the experiencer. Graziano (2016) and Dennett (1991) argue that phenomenal consciousness plays an important and evolutionarily explicable role in our mental lives. It is reasonable to expect that scientific psychology would want to study it. This could be done while bracketing questions about the existence of phenomenal properties.13 In a similar way, a scientific psychology that studied childhood dreams might talk about the role of representations of Santa Claus and unicorns in a child’s cognitive economy – without attempting to redefine those terms to refer to physical entities, or positing real entities corresponding to those terms. Talk of phenomenal feels can remain in scientific psychology, albeit with the codicil that the entities that allegedly stand behind this talk do not exist.
5 Discourse eliminativism about consciousness
We now turn to discourse eliminativism. Discourse eliminativism seeks to rid science of talk, concepts, and practices associated with phenomenal consciousness (even if phenomenal consciousness is still admitted to exist). In this section, we look at three discourse eliminativist arguments. The first is based on concerns raised by psychologists at the start of the twentieth century. The second is based on more contemporary concerns about how to study phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness and the mechanisms of reportability. The third is based on the worry that the concept of consciousness fails to pick out a scientifically usable category of phenomena.
5.1 Scientific behaviourism
One of the goals of scientific psychology in the first half of the twentieth century was to redefine psychology as the study of observable behaviour rather as than the study of the mind. To this end, scientific behaviourists argued that psychology should avoid talk of internal mental states, and in particular, talk of conscious states (Hull 1943; Skinner 1953; Watson 1913).
The rise of behaviourism in science was at least partly due to the perceived failure of an earlier attempt to scientise psychology via use of introspection (Titchener 1899). Endless disagreement about the nature of imageless thought was held up as an example of how unproductive that research programme was. One side of the imageless thought debate appealed to introspection to argue that all thoughts were analysable into images; the other used similar evidence to argue for the opposite conclusion. The disagreement was widely seen as unresolvable because the evidence could not be compared in an unbiased way. By the mid-twentieth century, introspective methods were discredited and study of conscious experience in science had largely been abandoned (Humphrey 1951).
Scientific behaviourists sought to reform psychology in such a way as to avoid these methodological difficulties. The subject matter of science should be publicly observable, verifiable, or independently experimentally controllable. Science should eliminate talk of conscious experience and use of introspective methods. However, this did not mean that scientific behaviourists thought that mental states, including states of consciousness, did not exist: ‘The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis’ (Skinner 1953 p. 35).14 Behaviourists proposed an alternative way of talking, thinking, and acting that they argued was superior (in predictive, explanatory, and methodological terms) to a science that appealed to, or attempted to study, conscious experience. Phenomenal consciousness, notwithstanding its ontological reality, should be excluded from scientific psychology; its study was methodologically flawed and appeal to it was unnecessary to explain behaviour.
Based on parallel considerations about verification and public accessibility, positivistically inclined philosophers argued for various ontological and/or semantic conclusions about conscious experience (Ryle 1949; and less clearly, Wittgenstein 1958). They redefined mental state language in terms of behavioural dispositions and/or tried to eliminate qualitative conscious feelings from ontology. However, connecting these two lines of thought – one about scientific practice and the other about ontology/semantics – requires accepting auxiliary claims about the role of science in determining our ontology. Many scientific behaviourists did not rely on these assumptions. They argued for the elimination of talk of conscious experience from science based on pragmatic rather than ontological/semantic concerns.
5.2 Eliminativism via independent access
A different methodologically motivated form of discourse eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness is found among some consciousness researchers today. This stems from problems involved in trying to operationalise consciousness, or in finding ways to experimentally probe it.
One way of operationalising consciousness is via some kind of reportability: a subject is conscious of a stimulus if and only if they report it or respond to it in some way. This sounds fairly straightforward, but there are problems with using reportability as a marker for the presence of phenomenal consciousness, rather than as a marker for the cognitive capacities associated with consciousness. These problems can motivate a position of discourse eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness.
First, consider the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness refers to felt conscious experiences, (diet) qualia, raw feels, and so on. Access consciousness refers to the aspects of consciousness that are associated with, or that can be used in, cognitive capacities like reasoning, action, verbal report, and so on. If we somehow knew that access and phenomenal consciousness were always bound together (no cognitive access without phenomenal consciousness and vice versa), then scientific ways of probing access consciousness would also function as scientific ways of probing phenomenal consciousness. That is, if phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness always go together, then probing access consciousness just is to probe phenomenal consciousness. In this case (absent any other problems), it would be perfectly legitimate for the term ‘phenomenal consciousness’ to figure in scientific discourse, because the phenomenon it picks out is scientifically accessible.
The problem is that it is not obvious whether the aspects of consciousness picked out by access and phenomenal consciousness are always co-present. According to Block (1995), there may be instantiations of phenomenal consciousness (raw feels) without any related cognitive access (ability to respond to or report about these raw feels). Block has outlined a number of examples where this might happen, including when subjects may have highly detailed and specific phenomenal experiences, but be unable to report the details of them (Sperling paradigm); cases of phenomenal consciousness of unattended items; and possibly cases of hemi-spatial neglect, where subjects do not appear to have access to phenomenal experiences from some part of their visual field (see Block 2007, 2011, 2014; Irvine 2011; Phillips 2011 for discussion). In most of these cases, there is evidence that subjects are at least processing sensory information that they are unable to report about. Block’s claim is that there is a layer of untapped and unaccessed phenomenal consciousness present in these cases, in addition to whatever can be overtly reported or measured.
The lack of a way to probe the phenomenal aspect of consciousness independently of the accessibility aspect makes it difficult (or impossible) to scientifically assess these claims. It looks like any way of probing phenomenal consciousness requires that the experience have some measurable effect on the subject, possibly such that she can report it in some way. That is, accessing phenomenal consciousness relies on it being associated with some kind of cognitive function or capacity, therefore accessing phenomenal consciousness relies on it being associated with access consciousness. So, if an instance of phenomenal consciousness is not associated with access consciousness, then it looks like we cannot tell if it is present or not. As Dehaene et al. (2006) note, whether participants in an experimental situation ‘actually had a conscious phenomenal experience but no possibility of reporting it, does not seem to be, at this stage, a scientifically addressable question’ (p. 209).
Partly in response to this worry, Block, Lamme, and colleagues have argued for the possibility of indirectly investigating these purported instances of phenomenal consciousness without accessibility (Block 2011, 2014; Lamme 2006; Sligte et al. 2010). The idea here is to find some reasonable and measurable marker for the presence of consciousness in cases where phenomenal (and access) consciousness is clearly present (call this marker, \(M\)). The marker could be a particular neurophysiological signature (e.g. evidence of strong feed-forward processing), or a behavioural marker (e.g. ability to complete a particular type of task based on a set of visual stimuli). One then argues that if the special marker \(M\) is present in a subject, then regardless of whether the subject appears to be conscious of the test stimulus according to other standard measures of (access) consciousness, the subject is phenomenally conscious of that stimulus. That is, marker \(M\)’s presence guarantees that a subject is phenomenally conscious of the test stimulus, even if they don’t report seeing it, or can’t perform a range of actions that we usually associate with being conscious of a stimulus. The subject is phenomenally conscious of the stimulus without having cognitive access to that experience.
However, problems of interpretation abound here. Such behavioural and neurophysiological evidence could be taken as indirect evidence of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness, but it could also be interpreted as evidence of unconscious processing (i.e. that we got the special marker \(M\) wrong), or of graded cognitive access and phenomenal consciousness of the stimulus (see replies to Block 2007). There are no direct scientific grounds on which to choose between these interpretations, because there is no direct way to assess whether marker \(M\) has anything to do with phenomenal consciousness.
One response to these discussions is to advocate discourse eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. This is based on accepting that there is no direct way to probe phenomenal consciousness independently of cognitive access, and that there are no straightforward empirical ways of testing the claim that phenomenal consciousness can be present independently of cognitive access. In this case, the only aspect of consciousness that can definitely be probed scientifically is cognitive access, that is, access consciousness. In terms of scientific practice, the safest methodological route is to drop talk of phenomenal consciousness. Something like this position appears to be taken by a number of consciousness researchers (possibly including Dehaene).
This position is compatible with a range of claims about the ontology of phenomenal consciousness. One might say that phenomenal consciousness can (possibly or probably) exist without cognitive access, or be agnostic about this possibility. Alternatively, one might argue, with Cohen & Dennett (2011), that if a phenomenally conscious state is not accessible to scientific enquiry or to the subject having it (e.g. via some kind of report), then it is (evolutionarily, cognitively) implausible to call it a state of consciousness at all. In this case, if phenomenal consciousness exists, it always co-occurs with cognitive access.
5.3 Eliminativism via identity crisis
The argument for discourse eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness outlined above is based on a problem with accessing the phenomenon in question. Another kind of discourse eliminativism is based on the problem of identifying the phenomenon in question. For the sake of argument, ignore the problem of access raised in the previous section. Assume that phenomenal consciousness always co-occurs with access consciousness (perhaps for the reasons suggested by Cohen and Dennett above), so that we can (for the minute) work just with the term ‘consciousness’ which will pick out both. Even with the problem of access out of the way, it is still questionable whether the concept of consciousness picks out a clear category of phenomena that is scientifically useful. If it does not, this provides a new motivation for discourse eliminativism about consciousness, and (by assumption) discourse eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness.
It was suggested above that there is a reasonably broad consensus that assessing the presence or absence of consciousness has something to do with reportability. Reportability can be realised in a number of ways, however, some of which are incompatible with each other (see Irvine 2013 for review). One ‘objective measure’ (taken from psychophysics) of consciousness relies on forced-choice tasks: for example, subjects are shown a masked stimulus for a short period of time and are ‘forced’ to choose between two response options (stimulus present/absent, stimulus was a square/circle). On the basis of their response, the subjects’ underlying ‘sensitivity’ to the stimuli is calculated. The resulting objective measure of consciousness is highly stable and not subject to biases, but it is liberal, and often attributes consciousness of stimuli to subjects who explicitly deny having any. As a result, it is sometimes criticised as merely being a measure of sensory information processing and not of consciousness (e.g. Lau 2008). Despite being acknowledged as problematic, objective measures tend to be used in studies of consciousness because of their desirable properties as scientific measures (they are stable, bias-free).
In contrast, ‘subjective measures’ of consciousness use free reports or similar responses generated, sometimes in advance, by the subjects. The experimental methodology may be based around emphasising careful use of introspection, assessing subject’s confidence in their reports (sometimes using wagering), or just recording simple, untutored responses. Subjective measures get closer to what the subjects themselves acknowledge about their conscious experience. However, the precise ways that subjective measures are generated can have a significant impact on whether consciousness is deemed to be present or absent (or somewhere in between) (Sandberg et al. 2010; Timmermans & Cleeremans 2015). As scientific measures, they are highly unstable and subject to bias. They also regularly conflict with objective measures (except under artificial training conditions), and they are generally thought to be conservative (they normally do not capture all instances of conscious experience).
These difficulties reappear in debates about the neural correlate(s) or mechanism(s) of consciousness. Behavioural measures of consciousness are key in identifying these correlates and mechanisms. Roughly speaking, one chooses a behavioural measure; identifies the neural activity that occurs when the measure says that consciousness is present; and treats this as ‘the’ correlate or mechanism of consciousness. However, using different behavioural measures (unsurprisingly) leads to the identification of different neural correlates. The latter span all the way from ‘early’ neural activity for some liberal measures of consciousness (which may capture early sensory processing), to ‘late’ and attention-based neural activity for conservative measures (which may capture later cognitive uptake of the conscious experience) (see Irvine 2013). Without agreement about what counts as the ‘right’ behavioural measure of consciousness, there can be no agreement about what the neural correlates and mechanisms of consciousness are.
The plethora of measures and mechanisms of consciousness is not necessarily problematic in itself, but Irvine (2012) argues that there is no methodologically viable way of resolving disagreements between them when they conflict. Each measure has its pros and cons, but none is both scientifically adequate (i.e. fairly stable over repeated measures and bias-free) and fits with pre-theoretic commitments about consciousness. To choose one measure would be to (operationally) define consciousness by fiat, which would undermine the motivations for engaging in ‘real’ consciousness science in the first place. Furthermore, the mechanisms that correlate with these varied measures do not form a well-demarcated scientific kind, or even a well-demarcated group of kinds. They have no more in common than any arbitrary group of mechanisms within perception and cognition. They range across sensory processing, attention, decision making, report, and meta-cognition.
This suggests a reason for eliminating talk of consciousness from science. There are a wide range of incompatible things that ‘consciousness’ could pick out, and no methodologically acceptable way of deciding between them. If a scientific concept is surrounded by such problems, then (if they are bad enough) that is motivation for eliminating the concept. These methodological problems are compounded by pragmatic ones. Given it is unclear what ‘consciousness’ refers to, talk of consciousness generates unproductive debates and miscommunication; it blocks the generation of useful predictions and generalisations; and it promotes misapplications of research methodologies and heuristics. That is, there are negative practical consequences from continued use of the concept ‘consciousness’ in science.
There is also a better alternative. This alternative demands that researchers use terms that clearly demarcate the phenomena under study, potentially by referring to how they are experimentally operationalised. This could be done by splitting up phenomena previously grouped under the single heading ‘consciousness’ by how they are measured (e.g. forced-choice tasks, confidence ratings, or free report). Using these more specific terms avoids the problems above. By precisely specifying what the phenomena are and how they are measured, there is no ambiguity about which phenomenon is picked out. This would also make it possible to identify the neural mechanism that generates the phenomenon, make robust predictions and generalisations about the phenomenon, and avoid miscommunication.
As before, discourse eliminativism is not tied to entity eliminativism (for example, Irvine’s (2012) position does not entail entity eliminativism of any sort). Discourse eliminativism is about which representations, concepts, methods, and practices are appropriate and useful to science. Whatever consciousness (access or phenomenal) is may still be out there, even if the concept of ‘consciousness’ is not a useful one for science.
In this chapter, we have reviewed a variety of arguments for entity and discourse eliminativism. Entity eliminativists deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness; discourse eliminativists deny the utility of talking about phenomenal (and perhaps access) consciousness in science.
Entity eliminativism can be defended in a number of ways. A standard method is to describe the entity in question, then show that nothing satisfies that definition (4.1). This can be expanded to the method of using examples to fix the subject matter (4.2). A third approach, taken by illusionists (4.3), is to use a loose definition of the relevant entity/property, but argue that whatever this refers to, it is theoretically and metaphysically simpler and more productive to assume that the entity does not exist. A problem that faces entity eliminativists of all types is the ‘illusion problem’, a mirror image of the hard problem faced by realists, which requires an eliminativist to explain how something non-phenomenal can give rise to something that seems phenomenal.
Discourse eliminativism concerns the net benefit to science of various ways of talking, thinking, and acting. Classic scientific behaviourism focused on what could be measured in a public and ‘observable’ way, eradicating talk of mental states (5.1). More recent scientific work on consciousness has tended to move away from discussion of phenomenal consciousness on the basis that it is not clear whether scientific methodology can probe it independently of the cognitive abilities associated with access consciousness (5.2). An argument can also be made that the general concept of consciousness should be eliminated from scientific talk given the problems in clearly demarcating the phenomenon in question (5.3). Eliminating discourse about phenomenal consciousness from science might seem to remove a key concept in explaining human behaviour. However, this is not necessarily the case: specific reports and judgements about phenomenal consciousness can still function in explanations, and as explanatory targets in their own right.
We would like to thank Uriah Kriegel and Tim Bayne for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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In focusing on ‘serious’ science, the discourse eliminativist makes no claim about whether this or similar talk, thought, and practice should be eliminated from other aspects of human life. What might be unacceptable to serious science may be tolerated, or even welcomed, in popularisations of science, folk tales, religious practice, jokes, or science fiction. The boundary between ‘serious’ science and other aspects of human enquiry is not sharply defined. For the purposes of this chapter, we do not attempt to define it. We merely identify ‘serious’ science as work currently recognised as such by the scientific community, in contrast to, say, popular exposition of scientific research, adaptation of that scientific research for other ends, or training that is merely propaedeutic to conducting scientific research.↩
Quine (1980) offered a bridge from discourse eliminativism to entity eliminativism with the quantificational criterion of ontological commitment. However, this bridge fails to link the two forms of eliminativism in a deductively certain way. It relies on numerous assumptions that are contentious in this context: assumptions about the aims of the scientific discourse, about the overriding importance of stating truth in science, and about the correct semantics for the discourse. Quine also only proposed his criterion for fundamental theories. Participants in this debate (realists and eliminativists about consciousness) are unlikely to agree about whether the theories in question are fundamental.↩
This is how Dennett uses ‘qualia’ but departs from the usage of some authors who take ‘qualia’ to refer to non-representational aspects of conscious experience.↩
Other authors (including Block) equate phenomenal consciousness with experience. We adopt Frankish’s usage here for (slightly better) ease of exposition.↩
Frankish (2016a) describes a similar distinction between weak and strong illusionism, and Levine (2001) describes a distinction between modest and bold qualophilia.↩
‘Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the “external” world by the triumphs of physics: “raw feels,” “sensa,” “phenomenal qualities,” “intrinsic properties of conscious experiences,” “the qualitative content of mental states,” and, of course, “qualia,” the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined, but I’m going to ride roughshod over them. In the previous chapter I seemed to be denying that there are any such properties, and for once what seems so is so. I am denying that there are any such properties’ (Dennett 1991 p. 372).↩
Although we will not consider his reasoning here, Frankish (2012) argues that the concepts of diet qualia and classic qualia are not, on closer inspection, distinct and so Dennett’s ‘Quining qualia’ argument works against both.↩
The specific examples cited in Chalmers (1996), Chapter 1 appear to play this role. Schwitzgebel (2016) outlines a similar strategy, although with the commitment that there should be a ‘single obvious folk-psychological concept or category that matches the positive and negative examples’. (We do not think that either the realist or eliminativist need admit this.) Nida-Rümelin (2016), Section 3 outlines a similar strategy to identify ‘experiential’ properties, although she argues that if this strategy works, there can be no possibility of failure to refer so eliminativism is precluded. The general strategy of reference fixing by ostending examples from a single kind follows roughly the model used by a causal theory of the reference, although in the case of qualia the subject’s ostensive relation to examples need not be causal (e.g. it could be some sort of non-causal acquaintance relation).↩
It is unfortunate that many of Dennett’s intuition pumps involve subtle and slow changes in qualia. This has focused attention on failures of infallibility and incorrigibility in ‘bad cases’. The more worrisome lesson is that there is no knowledge of qualia identity even in supposedly ‘good’ cases.↩
Other problems with such efforts are described in Section 5.2.↩
Dennett (2005), Chapter 4 presents a similar argument for eliminating qualia using the phenomenon of change blindness, which again relies on cross-time comparisons.↩
Dennett-style eliminativism treats our ontological commitment to phenomenal consciousness as a theoretical mistake: there is nothing that satisfies the description of qualia, or qualia are ontologically inert and therefore it is safe to eliminate them. Somewhat differently, one can see illusionism as treating our ontological commitment to phenomenal consciousness as an introspective or perceptual mistake: we ‘perceive’ (via introspection) that our experience has phenomenal properties but it does not (hence the illusionism title). However, see Frankish (2016b) for ways of blurring the boundary between theoretical and introspective/perceptual mistakes.↩
Dennett’s (1991) heterophenomenology provides one model for how an illusionist might do this.↩
See Hatfield (2003) for discussion of the views of other behaviourists.↩
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Eliminativism
- 3 Consciousness
- 4 Entity eliminativism about consciousness
- 5 Discourse eliminativism about consciousness
- 6 Conclusion